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Book Reviews
Chaucer, Langland, and the Creative lmaginntion by David Aers. London, Boston
and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980. Pp. xii
236. $25.00.

+

The U creative imagination" of the title is dialectical in its perception of the
gap between traditional ideologies on the one hand and new forms of consciousness
and social being on the other. David Aers associates Langland and Chaucer in this
study because each possessed such an imagination, which led him to an
awareness of the problematic nature of traditionally-sanctioned views of reality.
The first three chapters deal with occasions in the B-text of Piers P IOW11zan
in which Langland acknowledges a tension between his own consciously-held
ideological positions and the imaginative versions of social reality which he has
imported into his poem. Chapter 1 argues that the poet-narrator and other
spokespersons endorse a view of society as a static hierarchy of estates, but
that this view is rendered problematic by representations within the poem of
social fragmentation and self-interested social practice. Chapter 2 applies a
similarly structured argument to Langland's treatment of the Church. Although
Langland regards the Church as a centralized, hierarchical, and wholly authoritative
institution, his imaginative t engagement with contemporary ecclesiastical realities
leads him to acknowledge its corruption by secularism and economic individualism.
Aers notes that revealed contradictions be.tween traditional ideologies and social
practice could well have led to apocalyptic resolutions, and he devotes Chapter 3
to an examination of instances in which Langland ultimately rejects the "temptation" to adopt such systems with their promises of total clarification. He
views Langland's resolution as private, anti-institutional, and anti-millenial, expressed through Conscience's final exit from Holy Church in quest of Piers
and Grace-" a lonely and individualistic pursuit of grace outside the traditional
institutions" (p. 79).
Framing Aers's four chapters on Chaucer is a discussion of the II reflexive "
imagination-an imagination which "discloses the processes by which authority is
constructed, its grounds in individual and social consciousness and practice"
(p. 82). Unlike Langland, who was impelled into such critical thought only
by the clash between his ideology and his ima.ginative rendering of social reality,
the mature Chaucer seems to have been predisposed to such habits of mind by
personal tendency and social context. In the course of Chapter 4, we are shown
several instances in which characters either exhibit or refrain from reflexive
thinking: ·the Wife of Bath (with her II de-sublimation" of authoritative texts),
the Pardoner (who reminds us of the human perspective of those who create
authoritative texts), and the Parson with his implicitly criticized failure of
reflexivity. Chapter 5 returns to the argumentative line of the Langland chapters.
revealing a contradiction between Criseyde's aspirations and the vulnerability of
her social situation, and defending her conduct on that ground. Chapter 6
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continues in a complementary vein with certain of Chaucer's "critical and
reflexive meditations on medieval marriage" (p. 151). The concluding chapter
returns to the early theme of social hierarchy, arguing that the Knight's Tale
actually undermines notions of benign social harmony and that Theseus's
"Firste Moevere" speech represents a ruler's effort at sacralization of his own
government.

This study is praiseworthy in its determination to move beyond superficial
consideration of social "backgrounds 11 into the interplay of traditional ideology
and social developments which challenge traditional formulations. In my view,
its strengths derive from those sections in which its thesis is most fully illustrated,
its weaknesses from those ,at the moments at which it is most taken for granted.
By this standard, the Langland sections-while more brief-are more authoritative
in their demonstration of the clash bet\veen his consciously-held beliefs and his
imagina.tive engagement with social issues. A further aspect of these sections
is their attempt to mobilize in the service of literary criticism such terms and
concepts of social analysis as ideology, mediation, and dialectic. These concepts
enrich this line of argument, though some further definitions and explanations
would be desirable. "Ideology," for example, seems at times to refer in a neoMarxist sense to the biased or illusory views promoted by a dominant social
class, and at times to refer more neutrally (in a sense based on Kuhn's theory
of paradigms) to all traditional systems of belief as they become subject to the
strain of new social issues.
Chaucer's disinclination to put forward overtly ideological statements necessitates
a shift in Aers's argumentative strategy, and his emphasis on Chaucer's" reflexive"
imagination is a reasonable adjustment. Yet he might have done more to
describe the social considerations which engendered this habit of mind. He
suggests in several provocative asides that Chaucer's reflexivity was paralleled by
contemporary trends in theology, that Criseyde's social situation duplicates that
of fourteenth-century women of equivalent social class, and that the political
world of the Knigbt's Tale exhibits significant" continuities" with Chaucer's own.
These promising suggestions are not, however, developed into a full theory
of Chaucer's imagination in its social setting. In consequence, his" reflexivity"
often seems to differ little from those qualities of ironic awareness noticed
by formally-oriented critics of the previou's three decades. In a series of local
arguments, Aers shows with considerable verve that Chaucer held humane views
on such issues of t\ventieth-century interest as militarism and the position of
women in society. Despite their interest and presumable congeniality to the
twentieth-century reader, these arguments do not advance his overall social
hypothesis as much as would a more systematic demonstration of the relations of
Chaucer's art with fourteenth-century social existence.
Even with such criticisms taken into account, this remains an invigorating
study. It worthily joins works by such British medieval scholars as Rodney Hinton,
Gordon Leff, Derek Pearsall, and Elizabeth Salter, who have raised parallel
questions in several interrelated disciplines in a similarly probing and undogmatic
spirit.
PAUL STROHM

Indiana University
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Tennyson and Clio: History in the J1ajar Poems by Henry Kozicki. Baltimore and
London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979. Pp. xvii + 185. $12.50.
Tennyson and Tradition by Robert Pattison. Cambridge, Massachusetts and
London, England: Harvard University Press, 1979. Pp. 178. $14.00.
New studies of Tennyson perhaps inevitably begin with attempts to show
that he was intelligent and well-infonned, something morc than a sensitive plant.
This is not just because Vi,r. H. Anden once stupidly caned him "the
stupidest" English poet. TIle very structure of Tennyson's poctry-selfdoubting, presenting" vacillating" s.tates of mind, idyllic and elegiac-suggests a
poet more concerned with heart than with head. But there cannot be much
question that Tennyson follO\ved the social, scientific, and theological controversies of his age closely and intelligently.
Whether such attention to the main intellectual currents of his age led
Tennyson to develop a systematic philosophy is another matter. Defenses of
his intellectual cogency run the risk of making him out to be too systematic, too
philosophical. This is the major '\veakness of Henry Kozicki's discovery in
Tennyson of an evolving" philosophy of history" on a nearly Hegelian scale.
Of course Tenyson's muse is Clio: there is nothing controversial about the
claim that "if any single interest appeared to dominate Tennyson's work and
thought, it was his concern about the whence and whither of human affairs"
(p. xii). "",Vhat Kozicki very usefully shows is not that Tennyson developed a
full-fledged "philosophy of history," but that his thinking about history,
responsive to many of the intellectual currents of his day, was more complex,
subtle, and profound than a mere unfocused curiosity about whence and
whither.
Kozicki's decade approach at times seems mechanical and unconvincing, as
when he claims that Telmyson's "philosophy of history ... breaks apart in the
seventies and even more so in the eighties as the three main ideas that once had
composed it begin to fragment into independent units" (p. 164). This only
begs the question of the extent to '\vhich these" three main ideas" (providence,
historical process, heroism) formed "a unity of thought" during earlier
decades. Kozicki shows that they more or less did hang together earlier, but
not that they fall apart in the seventies and eighties. Tennyson grows more
pessimistic; providence seems more remote; the historical process looks more
muddled than ever; and heroism seems more infrequent than ever. But these
are still main categories in Tennyson's thinking about history.
If Kozicki does not always acknowledge the confusions and lack of system in
Tennyson's ideas, he is still full of insights, perceptive readings, and useful
information about the contexts of Tennyson's social thought (the Cambridge
Apostles, Broad Church theology, and so on). These contexts he explores as
helpfully as anyone since Jo1m Killham (Tennyson and the Princess, 1958). And
the demonstration that Tennyson had coherent although changing ideas about
history is itself a valuable addition to our understanding of his complex greatness.
Because Kozicl{i interprets Tennyson's conservative social ideas as ideas, having
philosophical depth beyond mere emotional reactions to immediate events, the
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poet as social and historical thinker joins the poet as intellectual reconciler of
science and theology.
Robert Pattison's fine study of Tennyson's classical sources is not so \videranging nor so risk-takin.g as Kozicki's, but it is also ,about history. By treating
poetic tradition as a synecdoche for tradition (or hi9tory), he suggests that his
hunt for sources and influences is also an :analysis of tradition and innovation as
Tennyson's central values. vVhether poetic tradition can actually stand for
tradition in general in Tennyson is questionable. But Pattison is very good at
showing how the poet adapts classical forms-idyll, epic, elegy, epithalamiumto his own uses, thus "iewjog him as an innovative traditionalist or, perhaps, as a
romantic classicist.
Pattison almost does for Tennyson and the idyll what Robert Langbaum did
for Browning and the dramatic monologue, except that the Tennyson who
emerges is not unfamiliar. After Christopher Ricks, Dwight Culler, James
Kincaid, and the other recent critics mentioned in Pattison's acknowledgments,
no one will find tllls portrait of Tennyson I< as a craftsman consciously working
within a long and complex tradition of poetic forms" (p. 1) at all moot. J. M.
Gray, Douglas Bush, and others have already covered much of the ground of
Tennyson's classical sources. And tl:ere is something foned about Pattison's
framing of his argument: he retu.cns through G. K. Chesterton all the way to
John Churton Collins to find critics to do battle with. But Pattison's first
chapter is his weakest. Once he delves into the "long and complex tradition"
of Thcocritean idyll, Homeric epic, and the rest, he produces numerous useful
judgments, based on solid scholarship, about how the poet worked and grew, and
about how the tension of tradition and innovation yielded the organic unity that
is often not visible on the surface of the poetry.
Pattison may err on the side of making the poet out to be too conscious and
systematic in his classicism, just as Kozicki errs by making him out to be too
systematically philosophical. Between the bleeding heart melancholic and the
intellectual systematizer most recent critics have preferred the latter. But
perhaps all efforts to rescue Tennyson from Auden's accusation and its variants
are welcome and useful, as are these.
PATRICK BRANTLINGER

Indiana University
; "I
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Ge1'ard de Nerval: The j\1ystic's Dilellnna by Bettina L. Knapp. University,
Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 198. Pp. viii +372. $21.50.
Gerard de Nerval (1808-1855) is the first French writer to have used his dreams
as primary subject matter in his writings. His images attain an archetypal and
universal sigpificance. Attracted to the occult, he introduced alchemical images
and objects into many of his works.
Bettina Knapp explains that her study attempts" to evaluate Nerval's dreams
along philosophical, aesthetic, and psychological lines." Nerval's dream motifs
express his interest in a vast range of mystical topics and religious sects. The
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critic describes the latter in, the course of the book, enabling the reader to draw
parallels between Nerval's approach and ours to questions of sin, guilt, redemption,
and death. Having lost his mother at an early age, Nerval idealized all women,
but suffered when his picture proved untrue. As a way of release, he resorted
to figures such as Isis and the Virgin Mary, withdrew from life into his dream
realm, losing touch ,vith reality and ending his life in suicide.
Knapp interprets Ncrval's growing insanity, stressing his interest in the occult
and dreams, discussing their impact upon his literary productions. The first of
the book's three parts (" The First Darlmess") deals with the young writer's
attraction to the dead and to Germany, the country in which his mother was
buried: at nineteen he translated Faust 1. Under the influence of a great-uncle, he
became interested in mythology and the occult, responding later to his friend
Charles Nodier's encouragement to explore the unknown. In 1834 he met
his life's passion, the singer Jenny Colon, \vho, as an anima figure, joined his
former Platonic loves, but also became for him the Divine Mother and Wife:
he v.ras sure that if she did not love him in this life, she would in another one.
He associated her with the Queen of Sheba and wrote for her the libretto of
an opera of this title. After her marriage in 1838, he wrote her eighteen letters
(probably never sent) in which he developed the themes of sacrifice, of mother
and child, and of the son-lover. His love for her, after she died in 1842, took
on the proportions of a myth. Not surprisingly, he wrote, with Alexandre
Dumas, a drama called The Alchemist. In 1840, he started to translate Faust II,
which confirmed his belief in reincarnation. The next year, he was committed to
a mental hospital for the first time. From then on, he constantly mixed fantasy
(or dream) with reality, experiencing repeated episodes of insanity.
The second part of Knapp's study deals with Nerval's travels in the Middle
East, from which he brought back his strange Voyage in the Orient, an odyssey
of his soul and of his initiation into the mysteries of death. Fascinated with the
dream visions of Francesco Colonna, with the legends of Caliph Hakim and of
Solomon and the Queen of Sheba, he made them into archetypes. The third
section of the book examines Nerval's Daughters of Fire, which consists of six
tales, about six heroines, aU fire spirits. For him, fire was associated with solar
symbolism, the sun synonymous with creative energy, a guide to man in his daily
ventures. On the whole, this is an interesting study of the hermetic sources and
symbols of a sometimes radically esoteric writer.
FERNANDE BASSAN

Wayne State Uni-versity

Henry James: The Later Novels by Nicola Bradbury, Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1979. Pp. 228. $32.00.

Not since Ruth Yeazell's Language and Knowledge in the Late Novels of
Henry ] cmzes has anyone given the close attention to verbal structures in
James's fiction that is manifest on every page of Nicola Bradbury's study.
Without overly insisting on the sanctions in precedent and theory for her
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critical procedure, she takes her cues from William James's insights into the
expressive connections between linguistic units and states of consciousness, from
de Saussure's definition of language as a "system of differences)) that grounds
meaning on differentiations of verbal forms, and from Seymour Chatman's
analysis of grammatical and syntactical forms in James's late style. Intensive, at
times microscopic, attention to such linguistic and stylistic matters enables her
to define subtleties in motive and attitude among characters, but also to
heighten the significance of non-verbal forms and to discover, in a reader's
response to the process of "representation "-to the acts of expression and
communication that constitute full "representation" -the centml concern that
links reader, author, and protagonists in James's novels.
"The" reader is decidedly the alen reader for whom James wrote, described
here as at times puzzled or partial in his understanding but elevated finally, as
in most" reader-response" criticism, to the hypothetical status of "the most
alert reader" imaginable, who proves to be completely in tune with the
author's design, though protagonists ~re slow to attain, or incapable of attaining,
that status, and though earlier, even" attentive critics," have failed to qualify.
Bradbury'S first chapter is devoted to the representational functions of silence
as she can demonstrate them to be in The Portrait of a Lady, the novellas What
Alaisie Knew and Tbe Awal?ward Age, and Tbe Sacred Fount: the unspoken
dialogue of exchanged glances, tacit elisions, the "hush" of approaching death,
or the ". narrative silence" created by the evasion of crucial episodes and
the resort instead to indirection. Silence, whether helpless in the face of the
inexpressible, or deliberate in the face of the unspeakable, is a representational
resource for James because it operates at the" interstices of formal expression"
and, "reaching toward moral and even metaphysical significance" as a symbol
of isolation, it is flexible, "unquantifiable ,., in its "form, or lack of form." It
can reveal the machinations of "conspirators" and "manipulators" in certain
roles and contexts, or the integrity of moral paradigms in others. The
chapter is lucid in establishing its distinctions but too cursory in its coverage
to provide convincing readings of the works it takes up.
To provide such readings becomes the aim of separate chapters on the three
novels of the" major phase," and Bradbury's approach is adjusted significantly for
each. Her approach to The Ambassadors responds to the predominance of
visual and painterly imagery in the work. She applies Rudolph Arnheim's
analysis of visual perspective as terminating in a "vanishing point" that is
suggested rather than actually drawn, and that projects therefore an "infinity"
beyond the converging lines that graph it. Correspondingly she finds that
Strether gradually is brought to a compeletness of vision that writer and reader have
earlier attained, a "still point" (defined by T. S. Eliot's high Anglican Four
Quartets) that lifts Strether, for all ,his limitations, into the" freedom of absolute
nlorality" ; the "vanishing point" becomes the" absolute" realm of "right and
wrong."
Bradbury's meticulous examination of linguistic patterns, the particularities
of ~anguage, in the chapter on The Ambassadors, is the strongest feature of
her book, but it becomes increasingly apparent that other considerations, imported and imposed or less intensively examined, are governing her analysis,
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leading her to ignore the charged cliches and the usages of social decorum in
Strether's speech (Chad would be "a "brute," and U guilty of the last infamy ")
when transporting Strether to the realm of "absolute" moral vision.
In Tbe Wings of tbe Dove, Bradbury finds "no guiding rule of technique
dominating every expressive element," a. shifting stance or a "disjunctive tendency" in place of ".central perspective." Accordingly she grounds. her
analysis on the attempt of characters to read their own story and, helpless to
alter their fate, attain an "understanding" or "awareness" that becomes, in the
case of the heroine, an "objective appreciation" that is "on a level with the
author and reader," an "understanding inseparable from the author's own."
Verbal analysis implements this forced severance of Milly from her world
without convincingly justifying it. After first stripping Milly of any archetypal
or national significance that has been claimed for her by other critics or by
characters in the novel, so as to insist on her personal and human presence and
her movement in the social world of Kate and Densher, Bradbury views Milly
in her ethereal "transcendence II as II unscathed" by her usage at the hands of
others, free of the world's II constraints." Verbal analysis, however, is not
sufficient to distinguish characters' "manipulative categorization of other people"
from James's own. Bradbury's reaching for parallels (often based on echo and
"half-echo") to Vanity Fair and Otbello, her clear cut differentiation of protagonists from villainous "conspirators" and other characters, and her emphasis
(following John Bayley and A. C. Bradley) on cbaracters themselves at the
expense of dramatic action, are no substitute for the concern with the book's
dramaturgy that the work demands.
The culmination of Bradbury'S study is the chapter on The Golden Bowl.
(A "Conclusion" largely reiterates claims already fully presented, and the
penultimate chapter on the II Last Works II takes up the later fiction and nonfiction swiftly in an effort to declare that they will not sustain the interest· of the
three great novels.) Here she acknowledges explicitly what has been implicit in her
analysis all along: that the novel's language must be considered in its interaction
with II actions" and II characters," or with the larger contours of II scene-sequences."
Although Bradbury's focus is thus widened as it must be, her rhetoric is channeled
narrowly into the effort to exonerate Maggie from charges brought against her
by her harshest critics (" We suspend narrow condemnation in the interests of
a larger propriety") and to smooth out the moral complexities of the action
and of James's responsibilities in writing it. The verbal analysis is at times
finicky (there are virtually ludicrous claims made for the repetition of "for"
in one sequence), and a firm though vaguely defined decorum is invoked as a
standard against which to measure stylistic features which become conspicuous
and suspiciously expressive in James: the "stylistic exuberance," the II excess" of
melodrama, verbal statement, and imagery in the fiction. Some such features,
Bradbury has explained earlier, elicit "the" reader's sympathic engagement
with the characters, while others provoke a more detached "intellectual. rather
than imaginative, attention." In either case Bradbury responds to, them in
such a way that they indicate corrosions, distintegrations, or incompletions,
blindness or groping apprehension, on the part of fictive characters, while
indicating at the same time that James's control is "flawless," that he and his
narration are not implicated in the characters' fantasies or maneuvers. Only
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in The Golden Bowl does he acknowledge that some "excesses" of imagery,
easily excused by Bradbury, are also his own.
The issue that proves to be central to her reading of James is the issue of
his authority, the complications of which she suggests at points despite her
overemphasis on James's and the readers' relation to protagonists or "centers
of consciousness" among the fictive characters. Recognizing at the end that
six characters in Tbe liVings of the Dove are, "to some extent, authorial figures,"
she can only conclude: "how different arc their authority and reliability, and
how little relation this bears to their waddy position!" James grounded his
authority on analogies to painting and drama which Bradbury recognizes but
does not examine, and, as Tbe Golden BWJJl's Preface makes clear, on a
complicitous involvement V\rith his characters that eludes the moral perspective
which enables Bradbury so easily to distinguish" conspirators" from protagonists,
or the "materialism" of a character in one novel from the purchasing power
of a millionaire in another. The" exploiting" and "manipulating" that she
remarks in James's use of his materials bear no relation in her view to the
exploitation and manipulation that she condemns in the behavior of his characters.
James's exercise of authority entailed hazards, moral risks, of a kind that Bradbury
is eager to recognize in some of his protagonists but would ,deny to James
himself. The" ideal" in Tbe Golden Bowl, she declares, "approximates"
Keats's" 'Negative Capability,'" the capacity of ", being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason.'" This is an
enabling imaginative power that Bradbury rightly relates to the novelist's
"power to guess the unseen from the seen," as James claimed in "The Art of
Fiction," the "uncertainty" of the '" guess'" that Bradbury asks us to
recognize in James's best fiction. Yet when she finds Strether the exemplar of
negative capability she lifts him into a realm of "absolute right and wrong"
and finds "no uncertainty" in his final words. James's guesses finally, and
those of an alert reader, have no irresolution in her view; the hazard of guessing
dissolves in righteous certitude.
Indeed the term "category" in Bradbury's critical vocabulary defines the
conventional moral perspective that circumscribes her responses to the verbal
textures and movement of James's novels, and her use of it suggests problems in
critical methodology that critics have not resolved and this study dramatizes by
throwing into relief. Bradbury exposes as reprehensible the "manipulative categorization of other people" (including the "myth-making process"), or "the
tendency to categorize experience" in Kate's and Susan Stringham's imaginations in Tbe TVings of the Dove, and, while she exonerates the protagonist
Milly from the charge, she presents no ground for dissociating James from the
same activity. Indeed" preserving moral categories of judgment" is crucial
for Bradbury, and the" miscarrying of the various plots of The Wings of the
Dove, and of the good intentions of all the characters in the first volume of
Tbe Golden Bowl" is attributed to "inadequate categorization of experience."
The hazardous experience of reading James eludes the categories that Bradbury
applies with so firm a hand to the sensuous surface and the deeper rhythms of
J ames's fiction.
LAURENCE

Tbe Jalms Hopkins Uni'l)ersity

B.

HOLLAND
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Literary Impressionism, James and Chekhov by H. Peter Stowell. Athens: The
University of Georgia Press, 1980. Pp. ix
277. $17.00.

+

What is literary impressionism? That is one of the most vexing questions on
the critical scene today. H. Peter Stowell is aware of the many dilemmas which
plague the field his book addresses. AB he notes, "Impressionism has always been
a difficult concept to pin down" ; even worse, "there is little agreement about
who is and is not an impressionist." The reason for this confusion is that
impressionism is not one thing but many. It includes, for example, Ford Madox
Ford's doctrine of novelistic technique, a tradition of unreliable narration in
fiction, a movement in French painting, a concern with perception in philosophy
and literature from Hume to Pater and Conrad, and a period of transition in
the history of the novel from realism to modernism. The list could go on
and on. No single essence underlies the diverse group of elements which make
up impressionism. Instead, impressionism is inherendy pluralistic-a "family,"
in Wittgenstein's sense, like the group "games" which has no uniform set of
features shared by all its members, from chess to football. A" family" consists of
a series of resemblances and differences, convergences and divergences. The
challenge for students of impressionism, then, is to clarify and organize the
relations among its members without overlooking its multiplicity.
Stowell seeIIl3 to accept this challenge in his very choice of James and Chekhov
as his central figures. After acknowledging that the differences between these
two writers might seem more striking than their similarities, Stowell suggests that
"both their disparities and their affinities reinforce the argument that literary
impressionism was a widely cast and loosely held net that bound together the
most unlikely writers, all the while allowing them to swim freely." James and
Chekhov are related, in Stowell's view, because both respond in their works to
what Henry Adams calls the" supersensual multiverse." This is a fluid, pluralistic
world where change prevails over stability, where there -are many "truths"
which refuse unification into the "Truth," and where the meaning of
" reality" is open to infinite variation as perceiver and perceived shift in relation
to each other. By focusing their dramatic attention on the workings of consciousness, these two writers (and their kindred literary impressionists) "discovered modernism." Among their many differences, however, James tends
to depict characters who struggle relendessly to master and order the flux;
Chekhov may lift his characters into a privileged moment of synthetic perception,
but then he plunges them all the more deeply into the tedium of disconnected
drifting from moment to moment. By mapping convergences and divergences in
this way, Stowell takes an important step toward understanding impressionism.
Elsewhere, though, Stowell lapses into monism. He often refers to "impressionism" as if it were a single entity. His long and interesting chapter on the
distinguishing features of impressionism contains many statements of the sort:
"impressionism is this" and "literary impressionists do that." One frequendy
wonders whom he has in mind, since many of his claims fit some members
of the family but not others. At one point, adopting Joseph Frank's controversial
argument about spatial form in modern literature, Stowell asserts unequivocally
that II Literary impressionists, worldng in their temporal art, strove to spatialize
time." But this does not hold for the complex temporal structure of The Good
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Soldier. By dramatizing Dowell's rambling efforts to make sense of his past,
Ford emphasizes that we live forward but understand backward-and that no
spatial haven of synchronic comprehension can rescue us from the diachronic
vagaries of anticipation and retrospection. Nor does Stowell's assertion explain
why Conrad disrupts the time-line of the story in Lord Jim. Conrad's bewildering,
fragmented narrative aims to upset the complacent confidence of his readers in
cultural constructs and moral values which arc not eternal verities but only
historical fictions and hence radically contingent. Ford and Conrad, in their
different ways, seek not to overcome time but to prompt their readers to reflect
about the inescapable temporality of understanding and existence. Stowell is
right that many literary impressionists explore the nature of time by experimenting
with traditional conventions of narrative order. But" spatial time" is not an
essential feature of literary impressionism, a value shared equally by all of the
writers who s'wim in its wide, loose net.
When he describes the multiplicity of impressionism, Stowell argues that it is
"not a movement, but a far-reaching cultural phenomenon" which encompasses
not only literature and painting but also philosophy. Because it heralds the
modern preoccupation with the status of meaning and the limits to perception,
Stowell suggests that impressionism anticipates phenomenology. There are two
advantages to establishing this relationship between art and philosophy. It not only
advances our understanding of cultural history by charting the emergence of
modernism across djsciplinary boundaries; it also makes available to the critic a
useful conceptual framework for analyzing the impressionists' explorations of the
vicissitudes of consciousness. Stowell's book exploits these advantages with
mixed success. His study draws on only a very limited range of phenomenological
concepts, and it is sometimes imprecise in its usc of them. Stowell claims, for
example, that "The impressionist attempts to capture the feel, texture, and
consciousness of the phenomenological tabula ram or, in the impressionist lexicon,
, the innocence of the eye.''' But it is misleading to attribute to phenomenology
(and to all impressionists) an epistemology which believes that the mind can
make itself a blank slate. Stowell seems to refer here to H usserl's procedure of
" bracketing" -the "reduction" which suspends the "natural attitude" of
unquestioned engagement with the world in order to describe the structures
of consciousness and experience which go unnoticed because we take them for
granted in everyday life. The" reduction" is the work not of an "innocent"
mind, however, but of a trained philosopher ,vith sophisticated assumptions
and procedures. Furthermore, " bracketing" reveals that consciousness is
intentionally active rather than blanldy receptive. From H usserl through
Heideggcr to Gadamer and Ricoeur, phenomenologlsts argue that Immving cannot
be innocent of presuppositions; in their view. understanding is always directed
by the assumptions and interests of the observer, always guided by his
expectations, molded by his temperament, and limited by his situation.
Stowell quotes MerIeau-Ponty freguently, and the passages he cites are often
illuminating. Except for an occasional offhand reference to Sartre, however, he
makes no mention of the other leading figures in the phenomenological tradition.
Like impressionism, phenomenology is a diverse family. Although Stowell u:;cs the
term as if it referred to a single set of precepts, its net is wide enough to include
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Bussed's early idealism and his later turn to the realism of the lived world,
Heideggcr's quest for Being and Sartre's existential Marxism, Poulet's criticism
of consciousness and Ricoeur's henneneutics of the symbol. The diversity which
marks the community of phenomenological thinkers might even provide a helpful
guide for mapping the multiplicity of impressionism. Henry James seems to
share Busserl's interest in how consciousness persistently composes the \vorld by
projecting itself beyond the side of an object presented to it. Ford anticipates
Merleau-Ponty's fascination with the ambiguities and obscurities of unrcflectiyc
experience. \Vith Heidcgger and Sartrc, Conrad exposes the nothingness at the
foundation of existence. Stowell also misses the opportunity to take advantage
of phenomenology's research on aesthetics. Although he explores the role of
indeterminacy in impressionist fiction, he ignores Roman Ingarden's theory of
how literary works represent objects through a stratum of aspects made
up of gaps and blanks. Stowell discusses the reader's "role as co-maker" and
"active participant" in constructing a work, but his bibliography is silent about
\Volfgang Iser's seminal studies of the reading process.
Stowell divides Chekhov's and James's gro,\vth as writers into three stages:
"The Emerging Impressionist," "Hesitation and Achievement," and "The
Impressionist." After an initial period of discovery and exploration, each writer
makes some progress but also digresses or falls short before attaining his
ultimate vision. Stowell's own book belongs in his middle stage. Both in what
it accomplishes and in what it fails to do, his book points in directions ""vhere
ar.swers may eventually be found to the questions which surround impressionism.
PAUL

B.

ARMSTRONG

Unk'ersity of Virginia

Conrad in the Nineteenth Century by Ian Watt. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London:
Uni\Tcrsity of Califorru:l Press, 1979. Pp. xvii
3i5. $21.50.

+

Ignoring the deconsrructi\Tc fibrillations of Derrida, the archeological pyrotechnic displays of FOllcault. and all similar innovations, Ian 'Vatt gives us a
phin, unvarnished Conrad. The elusiye Kurtz in Heart of Darkness originates
with the agent Klein whom Conrad sa\v dying on the Congo steamer Roi des
Belges. Yet, there is :m oycrlay of Arthur Eugene Constant I-lodister, a reformer
\dlO \\'i\S director of the SY71dicat C07J77JlC1'c;a/ du Katanga for a time. Yet,
again, Kurtz cJiffe:·s from both Klein and I-Jodister while ~howing similiarities
to numerous other celebrities: Emin Pasha (born Eduard Schnitzer 1840-92),
,\l;ljor ,\l11sgran.: B'lrnciot. :,md Charles I-Tenry Stokes (141-45). 'Vatt follows
his method thoroughly ~nd judiciously. He tries to find the origin of Conrad's
ficrion in his experience, carefully sifting other scholars' scattered evidence.
\Yithin the limits of \Vatt's plan, his \york will stand as O:1e of the most
important srudies of Conrad. 'Yatt's unswen"ing adherence to his method is
Loth the strengTh :md the weakness of his work.
Beginning \\1th a sketch of Conrad's earlier life (1857-94-), Watt defines several
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ways in which Conrad was a man divided, bomo duplex. The outlines of this
period arc well-known: Conrad's family's sufferings as a result of his father's
opposition to the Czarist rule of Poland, his Uncle Bobrowski's constant scolding
about the boy's irresponsible ways, his ,apparently self-inflicted "\vonnd in
Marseilles. In these experiences Watt locates the major themes of Conrad's
fiction: his pessimistic perspective, his distrust of bourgeois values, his concern
to transcend Byronic indivdualism to reach a larger loyalty, his interest in
doomed resistance, heroic defeat, and fidelity. These themes set Conrad
apart from other English novelists of his time and are rooted in his personal
experience as well as in the literature of his native Poland. Conrad is torn by
emotional and intellectual contradiction. His painfully created fiction is his
attempt to resolve these anxieties. Watt believes that in the face of all forces
which dwarf individual human effort, Conrad clings to the moral imperative of
" solidarity" or commitment. As Conrad himself noted, his theme is fidelity.
Watt devotes a chapter each to explication of four works written in the 19th
century (Almayer's Folly, The Nigger of the Narcissus, Heart of Darkness,
and Lord Jim). When the curious reader turns to the series of Concordances
and Verbal Indexes to these works by Conrad, it is a bit surprising to sec that
the word solidarity docs not ocour at all in A/mayer's Folly, nor Heart of
Darlmess, and the single occurrence in L01-d Jim does not refer to human relationships. The theme unifying these four works is undenominated in the texts.
Intuitively, most readers feel that there is a process of development evident
in these four works. Clearly the shapeliness and economy of Heart of
Dm'kness is of superior quality to the interesting but slack first novel, Almayer's
Folly. Watt's explanation of this development is not completely satisfying.
Almayer himself, of course, originates in the Dutch trader Olmeijer and the
topography of Conrad's Sambir reflects actual settlements astride the Berau
river. The fiction transforms these experiences to conform to "current
market formulae" (43), which are contradicted by a drive toward the very
serious French models of Flaubert and Maupassant, so that "Almayer is a
Borneo Bovary" (51). These aims are incompatible, for the reader luxuriates in
the romantic fantasies of Nina, while ridiculing her father's inability to escape
from his dreams. V{att sees this problem as primarily commercial. Conrad was
trying to reach a much larger audience than Flaubert and so he created "the
more serious issues» (55) embedded in a cocoon of moonshine. He also notes
that Conrad's English is a bit awkward in his first novel in its sentence structure,
repetition, and over-qualification; and he observes that Conrad's prose becomes
more fluent with each succeeding book. Finally. he sees Conrad as using the
ironical stance of Flaubert to evade confronting the problems in the character
of Almayer which were painful for the author personally.
In The Nigger of the Narcissus \Vatt sees a sharpening of thematic focus,
which can be clarified by ideas stated by Emile Durkheim's De fa dk'ision du
tra·vail social, even though it is unlikely that Coruad had read this work.
Durkheim argues that the division of labor in modern society creates an
organic unity. In order for such a group to function, it must hal,'e a concensus
of values and attitudes, Watt sees The Nigger of the Narcissus as the examination
of organic unity, the ship's crew, under such extreme stress that its solidarity
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crumbles into a state of anomie, to use Durkheim's vocabulary. The figure of old
Singleton, after thirty hours, still steering at the wheel of the ship is Conrad's
affirmation of "The ultimate and universal basis of human solidarity" (125).
The diachronic movement Watt is tracing in Conrad's works appears to he a
process of clarifying the author's ideology. Alrnayer's Folly involves issues
which are clarified to some degree in The Nigger of the Narcissus and which
will become even clearer in the masterpieces Heart of Darkness and Lord Jim.
While readers may agree that H cart of Darkness crackles with a power, found
only faintly pulsing in the earlier works, it is not so obvious that Heart of
Darkness compels because of its ideological sharpness. Is Heart of Dm'kness
remarkable because it is Conrad's "ideological summa" (148)?
When Watt turns to Heart of Darkness his study repeatedly turns up
matters of biographical -and historical fact which significantly color our
understanding of the text: when Conrad began to write for Blackwoods, he
acquired a new sense of audience; in the current myth of "going native,"
Conrad might see the process of his own denationalization; in the vision of
the Imperial mission in popular writers like Kipling and Rider Haggard, the
virtues of duty, military discipline, and technological efficiency provide the
assumptions scrutinized in Conrad's story. Watt is less satisfactory in dealing with
the problem of nonnative judgment in the work. If dus text sums up Conrad's
worthwhile thinking on historical and social problems, why is it finally so opaque,
so inconclusive? The argument that "inconsistencies in Conrad's attitudes to
colonial and racial problems must in general be understood in their historical
context" (160) does not explain why modem readers should find an "inconsistent" ideological position gratifying. Watt's judgment that "Heart of
Darkness . .• endure (s) .as the most powerful indictment of imperialism" (161),
is not self-evidently true. Marlow, in the final scene, does lie to the Intended
bride of Kurtz, so concealing the true horror of the European presence in Mrica.
Conrad, too, does not publish his diary of horrible observed facts in the Congo,
but softens these facts into fictional ambiguities for public consumption. To
account for the improvement of Heart of Darkness over Almayer's Folly, we
must acknowledge that Heart of Darkness is systematically obscure, and that
growing obscurity does not fit easily into the theory that Conrad's works are best
when most ideologically incisive.
Watt explains the artful ambiguity of Heart of Darkness as the consequence of
Impressionism and Symbolism. Literary impressionism has been the subject of
lively discussion for at least the last decade. Watt refers to the "Preliminary
Papers" distributed for seminar # 8 at the 1975 annual convention of the Modern
Language Association. In -fact, there have been five seminars in the last six
years discussing this topic, as well as recent books on impressionism in Stephen
Crane, Henry James, and Chekov. Watt's judgment that II it is very unlikely that
Conrad either thought of himself as an impressionist or was significantly influenced
by the impressionist movement" (179) is, at best, only partially correct. Watt's
study plays down the impact of Ford on Conrad and does not see the
full implication of Conrad's move toward an ambiguously structured text, demanding a highly constructive role of the reader. Watt's consideration of the
phenomenology of art is deficient. He treats language under the realist assumption
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that it refers to an external subject, such as the Belgian occupation of the Congo.
He also considers the possibility that language is expressive of certain mental
states and anxieties in the author's or in a oharacter's mind. But he rarely
looks at a text as an experience. This is a serious shortcoming in any critical
survey of a piece of literature, but it is especially crippling if the author in
question is apparently a pioneer in exploring the use of language as a model of
perception and as a means to manipulate the reader's process of reading or his
encounter with the artifact of the text.
Given Watt's method of analysis, his examination of the biography of the
author and his definition of how the text refers to historical situations,
it is natural that he should conclude, "What makes reading Heart of Darkness
so unforgettable is surely the harrowing power with which Conrad convinces
us of the essential reality of everything that Marlow sees and feels II (252).
Worb:ing on the theory that stridency of assertion always rises when the speaker's
doubt in his position increases, we are suspicious of the words II is surely."
How is II essential reality" different from just plain "reality"? We can
certainly imagine the opposite assertion, that the reader is captivated by
Conrad's work because he is constantly reminded that it is a fiction, a tale told
by Marlow on the Nellie, twice-told by the outside "I" narrator to us.
If we want to get near II reality," why not read Conrad's Congo diary? Take the
entry of 3 July, "Met an off(icer) of the State inspecting. A few minutes
afterwards saw at a camp (ing) place the dead body of a Backongo. Shot?
Horrid smell." These lines are a good bit nearer the historical reality than the
inconclusive fiction of Marlow, yet they lack the power of the verbal artifice,
the conventions of fiction which Conrad constantly manipulates precisely to
remind his audience t:hat they are reading a story.
Consider Watt's anthropomorphic assumption in sentences like these: Lord
Jim II may even have identified with Brown to the extent that he tbought that,
like himself, Brown ought to be given another chance" (342, italics added).
It is not unusual for Watt .to vivify characters when he summarizes stories,
constructing what these characters must have been thinking, what their
motives must have been, imputing a life to them independent of the words of the
text, like studying what Hamlet's curriculum at the University of Wittenberg
must have been before the play began. So, long as the reader knows that he is
participating in an activity, generated in him by the manipulation of conventions
in the story, and knows that literary characters do not really have thoughts
and motives beyond those stated by the text, such constructions are quite
properly part of the experience of the artifact. But as an explanation of the
artistic power of the work, Watt is on much sounder ground when he
acknowledges that Conrad had a theory for manipulating an effect in his reader
and that he marshalled the techniques of delayed encoding, symbolic deciphering,
and anachronic oscillation to that end.
But if we grant that "there is little question that Conrad conceived his
fiction in terms of a planned sequence of effects on the reader" (306), how
does his practice square with the aims of the naive moralist? Is Conrad's work
powerful because he discovered gradually that in this hostile world man must
maintain his solidarity, his fidelity, to what appear to be shortsighted goals of
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conduct (as Watt seems to argue on p. 125) or is it pmverful because the

artful author contrives verbal effects which let his reader glimpse only partially,
and hidden in a mist of anachronic oscillation and unreliable narration, his kernel
of truth? Watt \\rants Conrad to give us ma.">cims to live by. like Tom B1'own's
Sc"ool Days. But what the critic of Conrad must explain is why we continue
to read his work when it is most cunningly contrived to make the c::'I.traction of
such maxims from the text virtually impossible.
TODD 1(. BENDER

University of Wisconsin

Fables of Aggression: Wyndhtm'l Lewis, tbe Modernist as Fascist by Frederic
Jameson. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press,
1980. Pp. 190. $11.95.

V ortel:: Pound, Eliot, and Lewis by Timothy Marerer.

Ithaca and London:

Cornell University Press, 1979. Pp. 231. $12.50.
"I do not think I had ever seen a nastier-looking man," Ernest Hemingway
once said of Wyndham Lewis. "Under the black hat, when I had first seen
them, the eyes had been those of an unsuccessful rapist." Lewis's self portrait,
leering from the cover of Frederic Jameson's new book, confirms that impression-as do the violence, mysogyny, and fascist rhetoric in much of his
writing. He was a mean customer, and partly for that reason he is the least:
read of the so-called classic moderns. Critical studies like Jameson's (or
Hugh Kenner's earlier work, Wyndbam Lewis) are quite rare. Lewis is one
of those leopards who has not yet become part of the ritual in the academic
temple, and when he is pulled out of his relative obscurity he can be made
to seem as sensational and radical as modernism itself once was.
Jameson makes a point like this in the introduction to his book, which of
the two volumes under review is easily the more complex, demanding the
closer description. It is a small book with a remarkable theoretical ambition,
trying not only to reclaim Lc\vis as an object of attention, but to resolve a
couple of the oldest problems in Marxist criticism. First is the longstanding
debatc over modern art, represented on one side by the followers of Georg
Lukacs, who see modernism as a decadent, escapist retreat from social realism,
on the other by the followers of the Russian Formalists and the Tel Quel group,
who see it as a complex, often contradictory type of revolutionary praxis. Second
is the debate m"er Freudian interpretation, \"hich seems to be a "materialist"
method, but which has a tendency to subordinate the political to the personal
Freud gives a useful model for the understanding of history and myth, but he is
easily diverted to ahisrorical or purely individualistic concerns, and for that
reason Marxists hav..:! always had an ambivalent attitude towards him.
\Vyndham Lewis is a go~d subject upon which to focus these problems. He
is an obsessiye, pathological type whose work invites Freudian analysis. hut
as Jameson points out he is also an overtly political writer, rather like a
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Bernard Shaw grown up in a I< Dosto:vcYSldan social world." A dctermined
opponent of bourgeois democracy, he might havc become a bscistic mirror-image
of Shaw, except that he shares the modernist need to rein\'cnt languagc ~md
narrative form. Within modernism, howcver, he tal{cs up a contentious position,
placing himself in opposition not merely to nineteenth-century ide(ls of progress
and realistic represcnmtion, but to the twenties fascination with fa durcc and
private, impressionistic styles. According to Jameson (and Kenner before him),
Levlis has an "expressionistic" style similar to the early Brecht, and can therefore be exempted from the charges of escapism and abstraction Luk~lcs once
levelled against the modern novel. As for Lewis's racism and sexism, these arc
part of what Jameson describes as the" grinding contradictions" in his work;
they have at least the virtue of being presented openly, "as unbound impulses
released from the rationalizing censorship of a respectable consciollsness intent
on keeping up appearances." In plain talk, the man was no \vishy-washy
libera1.
Jameson's book sems to me to accomplish (I good deal of its purpose. which
is a workable synthesis of ideological interpretation, narrati\'e analysis, and
psycho:malysis. He borrows freely and eclectically from the whole raI1S"e of
Frcnch post-structnalist theory, and despite his tortured language he often makes
brilliant points about Lewis_ Ironically, howe,-cr, hc is most persuasivc \yhen he
approaches Lewis's ideology quite directly and traditionally, showing the contradictions and buricd wounds of social class behind writings like Hitler :md Time
and rVestern iHnn. As stylistics and psychoal1alisis the book has a good deal
to offer, but it is somewhat weakened bv a tendency to O\'erst;lte Lewis's
difference from thc other moderns, and by a slight ~v:1sion of the tensions
between Marxist and Freudian theory.
~
Jameson is concerned to show that Lewis's novels are "deccntcretl" and
destructive of what recent French writers call the "humanistic p:uadigm."
Lewis's prose breaks down the "illusion of an autonomous, centered 'self' or
personal identity," and according to Jameson it should be contrasted with
writers like Joyce and \\'oolf, whose internal monologlles are p:1rt nf a
"subjecth'ising and impressionistic" tendcne~' "'ithin modernism. Of cnurse
Lewis was also a vigorous proponent of the strong indiyidual, and in a
Jameson docs not quote he once claimed that" thc Absolute v:011l<l
individual of inclividu;1Is, the self that has ne\"ef brol{en down.,. fulit:· is to he
sought in the self or the person." Jameson argue's tlut sl1ch notion" are in
,"ivid contradiction with Lewis's fiction, and he reads that ficrinn as if it \':ere
a prefiguration of Lacan's revolution. In Lewis's work, J:1!llcson S:1:;". notion" of
the" self" or of "ch:1racter" arc shown to he mereh- :1l1 "effect of structure."
J\lcanwhilc J:1meson assigns the othcr modcrns to the p'lace LuJ.::~ic" put them :--'e:1I's
ago: the [c:11m of bourgeois indiyidu:tlism, \\'here the cult of pri\'atc pcr~(}ll1ljly
is fo11O\\"('o to its logical cxtreme.
Repeatcdl:- J;lme::,~n holds up Jo;:ce :l.!1d "Tonlf :15 Lewis's
preoccnpied with depth ps~·cholog-:;. the mol jIlSIC. and re.lli'.tic
In f.lct. howe\'cr. thc intC'rn:ll m()l1olo~\1e, like ;lrt fOf :J.n\ ~:1];:(,. \',~, :11,."" ~ jl1<lj'1.'
:1(h'crised t11:111 pr:tctieetl. :lnd b~' the ~btc n'."cmies it h.1d beSUl1 if)
the ycry p:lges of its best :1mhors. \·jrg-inid \"oolf ;ltt:1chd the e.lrl~'
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of Ulysses precisely because they were centered in a U damned egotistical self,"
and The Waves is surely one of the most sustained demo.Dstrations in literature of
the illusory nature of individual identity. As for Joyce, he began to dispense
with interior monologue and realist characterization midway through Ulysses.
(Jameson seems to me quite wrong when he claims that the "Circe" chapter
of Ulysses "serves to reconfirm the unity of the psyche.") Finnegans Wake,
which is not centered· in any consciousness, and which replaces traditional
characters with Beckett-like "psuedo-couples" such as Shem and Shaun, has
recently emerged as the ultimate post-structural text. See, for example, Stephen
Heath's articles in Tel Quel, or Colon McCabe's, new book, James Joyce and the
Revolution Of the Word-both of which champion Joyce for having virtually the
same qualities Jameson has assigned to Lewis.
On the level of psychoanalysis, Jameson proposes a method that will circumvent
the vexed relation between Freud and Marx. Lewis's perverse ideas, he says,
should not be analyzed as if they were "familial or archaic," nor as if they
were located in the "inaccessable" regions of the "private, biographical
individual" ; instead they should be placed in the" objective configurations of the
political history of pre-1914 Europe." He never tells us why the history of the
private individual should be any more "inaccessable" than the presumably" objective" history of the continent, but he does offer vivid illustrations of how
Lewis's art, like psychoanalysis itself, was affected by political and economic
changes.
One of the most impressive instances of Jameson's skill at merging psychoanalysis and ideological interpretation is his penultimate chapter, "How to Die
Twice," which demonstrates a contradiction between Lewis's belief in the" gifted
individual" and the satire he constructed to defend that belief. Beginning in
1928, in the series of books entitled The Human Age, Lewis devised a genre
described by Jameson as "theological science fiction," in which he violently
satirized the puppet-slaves of modem society and ruthlessly killed them off, preserving their " souls" in an imaginary afterlife, where their squashed and maimed
bodies were displayed in special containers. Because these were such obvious
puppets, Lewis was to some degree absolved of any guilt he might have suffered for
imagining their deaths; the genre itself gave reassuring proof that they had
scmehow survived, and since they were not" personalities," they could not be
subject to real death anyway. In the later volumes, however, Lewis began to
imagine a sort of Auschwitz...Hell, where the resurected victims and the angelic
citizens of the afterworld could die once again, and this time for good. This
"second death" was a necessary feature of Lewis's imaginary system, because a
more "real" death had to be constructed in order to preserve the notion of
individualism. On a deeper level, however, Jameson suggests that Lewis's vision
of Hell was an enactment of Freud's "death 'wish." Drawing on Laoan's
interpretation of Sade, he describes the fantasy of second death as " an index of the
way desire, exasperated by the unsatisfactory immediacy of its nominal fulfillment
in the here-and-now, seeks perpetually to transcend itself, and to project
the mirage and the I beyond I of a fuller imaginary satisfaction." Nor is this
fantasy peculiar to Sade and Lewis; Jameson claims it is felt in the attempt
of modernism as a whole to construct what Barthes has called a "miraculous

BOOK REVIEWS

, j

I

I),'

,

"

!

;t

393

stasis," a still-point of genuine Experience, which will relieve the tensions of the
libido in some ultimate way.
At this pain: Jamesan pauses to observe that the psychoanalytic framework he
has been using is "ahistorical." "However that may be," he adds, "it is clear
that such dynamics are peculiarly intensified by that process of reification
which differentiates our social life from that of every other social formation ... and
which is uniquely specific to capitalism." I have italicized one of his phrases
because it opens his argument to some important qualification. If Freudl s
Thanatos is present in all social situations, then" reification " could be detennined
as much by it as by capitalism. Furthermore the cult of Experience and imaginary
stasis, which Jameson and Barthes claim are historically specific to modernism,
are well-known themes of the Romantic movement; indeed one of the major
problems of Fables of Aggression is that it makes the obsessions of Wyndham
Lewis sound a great deal like the obsessions which recur in English literarure
from Wordsworth to Virginia Woolf.
In raising these objections I do not mean to discount Jameson's argument as a
whole. His book is the best piece of criticism we have on Lewis, and
will certainly revive interest in his work. More than that, it is a valuable, sustained
demonstration of post-structuralist method, addressed to real political issues.
Compared to it, Timothy Materer's Vortex seems to occupy a sheltered world.
A conventional scholarly study, Materer's boole describes, largely through quotation, the evolving ideas of Lewis, Pound, and Eliot, who were never
exactly a" school," but who remained a friendly axis from the 1912-1914 period
of the London vortex until Lewis's death in the fifties. In seven chapters,
punctuated with illustrations from the paintings and sculpture of Lewis and
Gaudier, Materer surveys the failed attempts of this group to make an artistic
revolution. The major flaw in his book is that he never gives an adequate
explanation of why the revolution was significant.
Pound, Eliot, and Lewis were linked by their American origins and by their
essentially reactionary protest against democracy; nevertheless, in print they
often made what Pound called" eye-gouging" attacks on one another. Egoists
all, they never found a journal or a project that would unify them, and their
culture criticism lacked what Materer describes as a "positive" program.
Materer discusses the ideas of the group largely in terms of their debates over
various dualisms: art versus nature, the mechanical versus the organic, the mind
versus" reality," artistic detachment versus commitment, and so forth. Along the
way, he talces excursions into the ideas of Gaudier-Brezska and Joyce, who were
only loosely connected to the central trio, but whose art seems more impressive
and less doctrinaire.
Materer's approach is a perfect example of the kind of criticism Jameson
is reacting against. He performs a useful service in collecting the ideas of
pound, Eliot, and Lewis, but he treats these ideas as if they existed itt a
realm of pure thought, and he seems to accept the romantic ethos behind them.
Frequently he mentions the wars and political events that influenced the moderns,
but he never stresses the connections between their politics and their art. He
'leaves their ideology largely unexplored, and speaks in the same idealized
lW1guage they once used.. The c;omplex, overdetermined relation between art
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and society never troubles him: instead he moves complacently through quoabout H poetry," "culture," and H nature" as if we were all agreed on
what these terms mean. Ultimately he praises Pound, Eliot, and Lewis for their
"brave but often embittered campaigns in the field of philosophy and politics,"
and for" the still center of their achievements as artists." Their only deficiency,
according to this view, was that their tone was wrong, and their politics
occasionally misguided. Their work is therefore reduced to a set of liberal
pieties, and their H achievement" goes unexamined.
t~tions

JAMES NAREMORE

Indiana University

The Rbizome and ,be Floever: The Perennial Philosophy-Yeats and lung by
James Olney. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press,
1980. Pp. xv

+ 379. $20.00.

Readers of James Olney's unusual and original book will find in it a great deal
more than a comparative study of the poetry of "\tv. B. Yeats and the psychology
of C. G. Jung. Given the absence of contact between these two so likeminded contemporaries and the lack of influence of either on the other,
the manifold similarities in their thought provide striking evidence of the
vitality of the philosophic tradition that is the true subject of this fascinating
project, "the Platonic system, shaped by Plato himself out of his four great
predecessors" (9). The informing perspective of tlllS ambitious "exercise
in the history and psychology of ideas" (x) is set forth in an elaborate "prolegomena," where the author argues that the Yeatsian and Jungian blossoms"
draw their life from "both an historical rhizome and a psychical rhizome." He
proposes, accordingly, to trace these flowers back to their roots "in ancient
Greece and in the collective depths of the unconscious" (13). Whether the
book succeeds as an analysis of the psychical rhizome will depend in the last
analysis on the reader's willingness to make a Jungian leap of faith. Clearly
Olney has done so, for he assumes that U the Perennial Philosophy" is the
natural and necessary creation of a corporate human consciousr:ess" (12). Thus
his reconstruction of the temporal development -of ancient Greek philosophy is to
be constmed at the same time as a dramatization of "the nontemporal story of
the human psyche in its efforts, conscious and unconscious, to analyze and
synthesize all the experience that it encounters" (19).
Two-thirds of the book is devoted to a reading of Plato and the pre-Socrarics,
and Olney'S saturation in the original Greek texts gives his account an involving
and authoritative immediacy. His decision to focus his presentation of Platonism
on Plato himself and his predecessors rather than on his post- and Neo-Platonic
Successors wisely avoids duplication of the existing Yeats scholarship on the
subject by Kathleen Raine, F. A. C. Wilson, Morton Irving Seiden, and others.
A more important reason for this emphasis stems from the author's conviction
that by pushing his historical inquiry further back in time he is approaching
~he unconscious origins of hpm~ tJ1ou¥ht: th1,1$ he can speak of Pythagoras as
'jj
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an exemplar of U archaic man," "who •.. remains in the shadowy darkness at the
bottom of evel"Y man's mind as he is also at the bottom and the beginning of
the philosophic mind of mankind" (81-82). These chapters are arranged,
to be sure, in a diachronic sequence from Pythagoras to Plato, yet Olney's
assumption of the continuous presence of a psychical rhizome in the human
mind is displayed in the synchronic unfolding of the argument, which moves
freely back and forth across the history of Western thought. The effect
of the constant juxtaposition of the views of Yeats and Jung with those
of their counterparts in ancient Greece is to stress the ubiquitous presence of
certain fundamental human ideas rather than their identification with the
particular individuals who espoused them. In accordance with this synchronic
perspective, the discussion of each thinker develops a particular topic: the
chapter on Pythagoras, a theory of aesthetics; the chapter on Heraclitus, an
account of process philosophy; the chapter on Pannenides, a theory of the
symbolic mode; the chapter on Empedocles, a thesis on time and history; and the
chapter on Plato, an investigation of myth and the concept of the whole man.
The essay on Heraclitus, "Logos and the Sensible Flux," is perhaps the
finest of the "rhizomatic" chapters. The name of Heraclitus, of course, is
synonymous with the doctrine that all things axe always flowing. His uncompromising vision of both psy che and kosmos as a pluralistic reality of endlessly
warring opposites is compensated, nevertheless, by a second and complementary
teaching: "behind all change is a constant law, a secret order behind chaos,
M')'of in 'll"aVTlt Pet" (99). The tension between these doctrines of Heraclitus
embodies the same balance between pluralism and monism that chaxacterizes the
thought of Yeats and Jung. Olney concedes that his synthesis of Heraclitean
doctrine "goes far beyond anything Heraclitus ever said· or perhaps could
have said" (122). Embracing the example of Yeats, Jilllg, and Nietzsche, he
readily acknowledges that he is teasing "a system and a universe ..• with all
the assistance Heraclitus can give us, out of the shadows and tendencies of our
own minds and out of the dark depths of the collective human mind" (123).
This is the author's approach to his subject here and throughout the book, and
with it he illuminates as never before the dark, paradoxical utterance of the cosmic
fragments.
With the treatment of myth in the chapter on Plato, Olney reaches the
heart of his argument: man's limitations compel him to resort to "mythic
speech" in his unending quest for lmowledge. It is this myth-making propensity that links the myths in the Platonic dialogues to the quantum theory of
Werner Heisenberg, the poetics of Yeats to the analytical psychology of Jilllg.
Jilllg is the key figure here, for his work not only exemplifies but addresses the
psychological dynamics of man's creation of symbols. A later chapter, "Psychology of the Pleroma," develops Jung's conception of the psyche as a system,
and given the intrinsic difficulty of both the concepts involved-the collective
unconscious, the archetypes, the individuation process-and Jilllg'S sometimes
cryptic, often shifting ,account of them, the exposition is admirable for its
elarity.
Much the same could be said of the chapter on Yeats, which persuades that the
apparent eccentricities of his thought-his preoccupation with the arcane and
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the occult, with gyres and cones-are" centric" in every way. In the experience
of revelation, recorded in A Vision and in so much of the visionary poetry,
personal emotion js transformed into general truth, the mind of the poet becomes
one with the mind of mankind. Yeats's poetry reenacts this lived experience of
the truth of "the Perennial Philosophy," and in a series of masterful readings-of
"Easter 1916," "The Circus Animals' Desertion," H Lapis Lazuli," and" Among
School Children "-Olney demonstrates the pervasive presence in the poetry of
a progress "from ego to eidos," from the "temporal world about us to the
eternal world of the work of art" (278).
The concluding chapter fonnulates the fundamental question posed by the
entire inquiry: whether man's building of systems is not merely a wishful projection of his need for order. The author's own answer comes in the form of a
credo: "All varieties of system-whether philosophical, psychological, theological,
cosmological, aesthetic, musical, or poetic-are all, by their structural order,
hierarchical imitations of the prevailing harmony that is the creative principle
behind and throughout the universe" (368). James Olney's searching analysis
of the psychology of system-making parallels Frank Kermode's anatomy of man's
creation of fictions in Tbe Sense of em Ending, and it deserves to be similarly
valued for its breadth of vision. At the last, his research emerges as a spiritual
and autobiographical quest: "The individual discovers meaning in discovering
a system-a myth, a likely story, a noble risk, call it what we will-that he can
believe in" (369). And so it is \"lith tllls book: The Rhizome and the Flower,
consciously designed as itself an imitation in the Aristotelian sense of the
very subject it addresses, is the latest bloom of that" great-rooted blossomer,"
"the Perennial Philosophy." The intent of this book of wisdom is evangelical,
designed to bring the reader to ask, with Socrates, "What is the right way to
live? "
PAUL JOHN EAKIN

Indiana University

Just Play: Beckett's TheatTe by Ruby Cohn. Princeton: Princeton University

Prcss, 1980. Pp. ix

+

3B. $18.50.

In her third book devoted to the writings of Samuel Beckett, Ruby Cohn
has decided to "play with Beckett's plays." She wishes to write" an implicit
appreci:nion through isolation of functional dcyices and theatre aspects," and
not" an introduction ... still less ... summary, paraphrase or substitute." It is tills
laITer, howenr, that furnishes the best capsule description of what she has
written.
The bool, is divided into three sections: in the first, she summarizes the plots
of I3echn's twenty published plays in six chapters; in the second, she
devotes a chapter e:lCh to [\\·0 unpublished plays and the evolution of Fin de
Partie; the third section's three chaptcrs arc a personal appraisal of Beckett
directing, persons with whom he has \vorked, and \vorks which are performed
in genres for which they were not originally \\"fittcll.
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The first section of the book contains little that is new or important.
Cohn selects lines or scenes, for the most part chronically, analyzing them in
terms of place and time, as soliloquizers and fictionalizers, and through repetition.
This has been done before with varying degrees of success by Cohn in her two
previous books and by many others.
If we might liken play to sport, this first section might be her compulsory
figure skating exercise, in which she dutifully selects the familiar lines and
passages that, since publication of Waiting for Godot, have been judged the most
important for scholarship. Pazzo's" They give birth astride of a grave, the
light gleams an instant, then it's night once more," does double and triple duty
throughout these six chapters, as do Clov's "Finished" and Hamm's "You
remain." These are only two of the most noticeable examples repeated and
made to stand for variants of the same information.
Cohn takes Not I through four separate explications which differ only
slightly with each telling, not nearly enough to merit (if we may borrow from
the author's own vocabulary) so much time and place. Her discussion of this
play in these first six chapters is a mirror of her discussion of all the other
plays: she deals with structural variants and offers little discussion that is
critically interpretive. By Chapter four, the conclusion is obvious that all her
writing thus far in this book is simply one more version of the enormous
body of criticism devoted to the reading of these plays, and it demonstrates
what is already well knO\VIl, that there is virtually nothing left to say about
them. Cohn makes much of Hamm's "yawn" in this chapter, and like Hamm,
we, too-yawn.
In her chapter on fictionalizers which follows, Cohn seems to be taking
enormous care to keep from saying anything critical or judgmental about these
plays. Rather than risk interpretive commentary, she prefers to skirt the issues.
She is almost finished with her compulsory skating, but rather than move into the
center of the arena to dazzle us with figure skating, she prefers to hug the
safe and comfortable boards along the edges of the ice.
Cohn writes that" fiction may camouflage and contradict so as to reach a deeper
truth," but she is not willing to heed her own words. She moves on in the last
chapter of this section to verbal repetition, chasing Beckett's" wordshed" from
Cascando, ", .. risking tedium," ,hoping that" this' churn of stale words' yields
new precipitates." Unfortunately, it does not. All tlus counting, even though
bolstered by her creation of new categories (doublets, triplets, distanced
repetitions, pounders, volleys) is still JUSt a number game that demonstrates more
the author's patience and ability to count, separate, and make arbitrary distinctions
rather than aid in the integral understanding of a Beckett text. Only rarely does
she impart something important, as when she speaks of Beckett dividing a 1971
Director's Notebook for Happy Days into segments called" Repetition Texts"
and" Variation Texts," but we wait in vain for more information about this
notebook because Cohn does not divulge it in its entirety but gives several teasing
examples of what she meant. For the most part, this section relies on studies that
have already covered this familiar ground, giving credit to (among others)
Clas Zilliac~s. Porter Abbott, and John and Beryl Fletcher (who are among the
noticeable ommissions in her index).
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What makes this book of value is the middle section, in which Cohn
discusses Hu:man Wishes, Beckett's 1937 fragment based on the last years
of Dr. Samuel Johnson, and Eleutheria, the finished three act play that Beckett
wrote shortly before Waiting for Godot and which has never been published.
She also devotes a chapter to Fin de Partie and, as she states in her footnote, it
must serve as an interim study until the fragment of the play sold in July, 1973 at
Sotheby's becomes available for scholarly perusal.
Beckett gave the entire manuscript of Human Wishes to C~hn, along with
two notebooks filled with information about the Great Cham's circle of
friends and his household. They have rested in a safe deposit box until now,
and although Cohn has printed the manuscript fragment in its entirety, she only
reveals partial notebook contents. Of course they are too long to appear
within this book, but one can't help but wish she had shortened the first six
chapters to one longish one and devoted more space, perhaps another appendix,
to the notebooks.
Again, this collection of material is important, but again, what she has to say
about it lacks any kind of critical force. She is not above charging that any
conversation pertaining to Johnson had by Beckett outside her hearing or any
opinion voiced by him but not in her presence cannot possibily be valid, and she
goes to great lengths to misread and discredit scholarship that is not to her
liking. This makes more for suspicion of the reason and rationality of her findings
rather than of the studies of which she disapproves. Her opinion, for example
of why Beckett abandoned the Johnson play: "He could not resolve the
conflict between the realistic biographical drama he had painstakingly prepared
himself to write and the verbal ballet he actually found himself writing." But
at this time, 1937, Beckett's published and unpublished writings demonstrate
clearly that there was no "realistic biographical drama" that he had "painstakingly prepared himself to write." This did not come until well after his
war-time novel, Watt. Cohn cannot bring herself to accept Beckett's own
reason for giving it up, and she invents this explanation which she contradicts
on the very next page in her chapter on Eluthbia, where she exp.r:esses surprise,
"-almost incredible," that Beckett could have written this conventional three
act play immediately preceeding tVaiting for Godot. It makes her strained
convolutions of why he abandoned Human T¥ishes even more puzzling, indeed
suspect. Her" playing" with Beckett's texts once again becomes personal
diversion rather than textual exegesis worthy of serious consideration.
Cohn is careful to correct errors she has made in her previous books, but
it is puzzling (one hesitates to say damaging) that she attributes this reviewer's
discussion of Elutheria in the biography of Beckett to a manuscript at Hwnanities
Research Center, Texas, when Footnote 42, page 690 of that book states quite
clearly that the manuscript's provenance is Baker Library, Dartmouth College.
In the third and final section of this book, Cohn coins another neologism,
"Thearricians," (to go with her earlier "Theatereality "), for persons who
have been associated with productions of Beckett's plays. She gives capsule
biographies of Roger Blin, Alan Schneider, Billie Whitelaw and a man named
Rick Cluchey, saying she has chosen to limit her discussion "to those
I most appreciate." Of these, her discussion of Whitelaw's performance in Not I
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is the most satisfying, simply because it presents new information. Her
discussion of Cluchey, a fonner prisoner at San Quentin, now deeply involved
with a group of actors committed to work in prisons and theatres called the
San Quentin Workshop, is probably intended to show Beckett's deep humanity
and to boost that struggling company's fortunes. It is an interesting vignette,
but out of keeping with the rest of the book.
In " Jumping Beckett's Genres" and" Beckett Directs," we again have Cohn at
play, taking information which suits her and changing what does not, shading it
into a gray area that falls somewhere between kindly intended misinterpretation
and deliberate misrepresentation. For example, Beckett's ongoing differences with
.Madeleine Renaud concerning her roles in his plays are not the genteel encounters
she hints of here, and her account of his problems with Patrick McGee in
recent years is a travesty of reality. She states emphatically that "There was
no problem about obtaining Beckett's permission" for David Warrilow to
turn The Lost Ones into a dramatic performance, but permission was not
granted to the Mabou Mines Company until the late George Reavey and his
playwright wife, Jean, interceded. This is a typical example of the kind of
generalization that makes one regard the entire book with caution.
We see, in Cohn's Beckett as director, a kind, munificent, entirely admirable
figure. Reading between the lines we see the rigidity, stubbornness and intractibility that makes many fine and brilliant actors refuse to have anything to do
with one of his productions. This is nothing to be ashamed of, and why
Cohn and others choose to keep it hidden is a mystery. Beckett is that most
fortunate of artists, one who enjoys such a demand for his work that he has
the luxury to insist upon its being presented in all the perfection of his own
personal vision. This makes ,him difficult to work with, but it is nothing to
distort or to hide.
Cohn continues, however, to reside in the mainstream of the kind of criticism
known among many scholars of modern literature as "Becketteering." This is not
a kind term, rather, it .describes that group which insists upon presenting to the
world a man so far removed from reality that-to quote a remark Cohn often
makes-" he is a saint." He is not. He is a perfectionist in his work, and this
makes him sometimes seem inflexible, determined, even quirky. He is an
artist who cares about his work, a quality often found in human beings, but
Cohn insists upon portraying him hagiographically.
This is true of much of her writing about Beckett. She has knovm him for
many years and he has given her manuscripts and notebooks which would be of
enormous value to scholarship. All was given to her in a spirit of open and
scholarly g2nerosity, but unfortunately, she chooses to divulge it piecemeal, thus
restricting any critical commentary and evaluation of what she has written. It
is this insistance on the "insider" approach that gives this book, like her
previous writings, an aura of acerbity that sometimes borders on the crochcty.
In general, tIns book does contain a certain amount of important information
for any Beckett scholar, but it is ultimately dissatisfying. It is so timid. Professor
Cohn plays, but the play is hesitant and cautious. She takes no chances, makes
no daring moves, has no sudden darts of intellectual vivacity. One thinks of
other kinds of play, ·of daring to steal horne in baseball or even in the children's
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game of hide-and-seek, or the' seerrungly magical penetration by the runner
of a football line, but here there is only the' careful shooting by a solitary
player of one lustreless marble around an otherwise empty circle.
DEIRDRE BAIR

University of Pennsylvania

Wallace Stevens: Tbe Making of tbe Poem by Frank Doggett. Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980. Pp. xiv + 160. $12.00.
In one way or another every reader of Stevens must confront his peculiar
fonn of obscurity, a deliberate pattern of elusiveneSs using various registers
of diction and consolidating nearly every kind of image with highly abstract
concepts. In one line he might make a generalized declaration about the nature of poetry or language or some other theoretical subject one would more
likely expect in discursive prose. Then in the next line he might offer another
broad aphorism seeming to contradict the first one, or if not that, he might
present an abruptly sensual image with no apparent bearing upon the philosophy
preceding it. His early poems (1915-1931) are not as explicitly theoretical as the
later ones (1932-1955), but these first lyrics still exert the same kind of
expository pressure, a force inducing a reader to search out in a work some
thematic model abstract and general enough to encompass all of that work's
disj ointed enigmas.
In the fifties and sixties, the period when the American academy first turned
to Stevens in an extensive way, the typical approach to tllls obscurity was
fairly direct. Critics like Louis Martz, Joseph Riddel, and James Beard tended to see
their task as one of unearthing the thought which the verse was presumably
concealing or only half revealing. But beginning with Helen Vendler's On
Extended Wings in 1969, a different approach emerged. Stevens, Vendler stressed,
was a poet before he was a philosopher. "Abstractly considered," she observes
scornfully, "Stevens' 'themes' are familiar, not to say, banal, ones." Accordingly,
her own inquiry would not concentrate on the poet's ideas but would instead
explore his art, in particular, the way the voice of the long poems becomes its
own protagonist, one heroically affirming a world that is inherently tragic.
The extent of Vendler's influence remains an open question, but whatever the
causes, the seventies did see, with several exceptions granted, a general shift of
concern away from Stevens' thought in favor of questions of style and influence.
The advantage of this more recent emphasis is that a poem is easily treated as a
poem, i. e., a text governed by conditions of meaning that are quite different
and in some ways far more complex ,than those governing, say, a philosophical
treatise. By this same token, however, the great disadvantage of this approach
lies precisely in its weak focus on Stevens' ideas. It characteristically assumes
that his thought is "familiar" or hopelessly inconsistent or vaguely indeterminate or relevant mainly in what it reveals about the influence of other writets-
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some predicate, in other wordsI' ~l1at· will make the conceptual cOhtent of a
Stevens poem no longer as problematic as "it was, thuS enabling the critic to get
on with the real task of studying Stevensf art. The difficulty is that Stevens'
thought constitutes a good part of his art. In fatt it does not take much
pondering to realize that an accurate description of the rest of his art depends
upon ail accurate understanding of his thought. Certainly some of the critics of
the fifties and sixties did on occasion treat Steveiis as if he were some systematizing philosopher and were doubtless guilty of other sins of reductiveness.
but on the whole they more squarely addressed the question of Stevens'
obscurity; and to my mind his obscurity is a problem that has not gone away.
Standing among the most important critics of these earlier years is Frank
Doggett, who in his book, Stevens' Poetry of Thought (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
Press, 1966) and several essays of this same period addressed the relation between
the poet's obscurity and his ideas as closely as anyone ever did. The Poetry
of Thought is a carefully wrought book that both compares Stevens' ideas with a
number of general themes in Western philosophy and at the same time cautions
continually against the temptation to ascribe ,a body of doctrine to the poet.
One feature of Doggett's work at this tiine is its immediate, unpretentious
pertinence to a Stevens poem. Consider, for instance, a point he makes in an
essay, "This Invented World: 'Stevens' Notes toward a Supreme Fiction'" (first
printed in ELH, 28 [1961], 284-99): "personification ... is the staple rhetorical
device of ' Notes toward a Supreme Fiction' .... Each personification is a kind of
man and at the same time a kind of idea." You can turn to almost any
part of "Notes," or for that matter many other poems, and see how
central personification is to the poet's peculiar kind of s~lf-reflexive verse.
Doggett's point is of the type that may seem obvious only because the principle
to which it directs us is-once it has been pointed out-so clearly manifest.
Doggett continued his research on Stevens into the seventies and has now
culminated this later effort with Wallace Stevens: The Making of the Poem.
Following the trend of recent years, this study lays enormous stress on what is
assumed to be the indeterminacy of Stevens' thought. The explicit theory in the
poet's later style is thus described by Doggett as "tentative and undeveloped" (p.
112), and the younger Stevens of the twenties is supposed to have considered
ideas as "extraneous to the real work of the poem II (p. 107). Doggett has
always been cautious in discussing Stevens, but this latest book turns caution
into a methodology. In spite of obvious similarities, the A1aking of tbe Poem
represents a different direction from the earlier Doggett, and I must say
I like the earlier one more.
In fairness to this book, I should also note that it has the same undecorated
clarity and shows the same acuity of the earlier work. Although much of the
material covered is not exactly new, its commentary still represents a genuine
contributionj the impression is of someone who has read and struggled with the
verse for years, someone who can bring a sense of the whole Stevens to everything
he says about him. Whereas the Poetry of Thougbt looked outward toward
'Vestern philosophy for its discussion of the verse, the AIaking of tbe Poem confines its scope to the Stevens canon. It first correlates the poet's prose statements
about poetic theory to his actual practice of poem-making, then moves to show
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how the lyrics themselves reveal as a body general semantic regularities that
underlie the meanings of any single work, and finally demonstrates how
certain stylistic features (like the poet's complex syntactic patterns) are intimately involved with a poem's themes. In using the prose to define Stevens'
poetics Doggett concentrates more on the Letters (1966) than the lectures of
The Necessary Angel (1951). This emphasis is unusual but quite appropriate,
since the letters, especially the correspondence with Ronald Lane Latimer and
Hi Simons, are closer to the specifics of Stevens' own views about poetry (even
though the relation between the letters, the theory, and the poetry is mOTe
complex than Doggett seems to assume).
The most innovative part of the book is the chapter discussing the "possibleness" of the poetry. Doggett sets one of Stevens' favorite words, "possible," in
opposition to the term" given" as a way of discussing the inductive and deductive
processes involved in poetic meaning: the" given" is to refer to the indisputable
infonnation a text furnishes, U its sound and statement 11 (p. 43) and the II possible"
to the figural connections and conceptual conclusions a reader makes as he
performs a text, an activity that is vinually endless, since, according to
Doggett, "the possible ... is a wordless and indeterminate meaning open to
conjecture .... and, after each conjecture, the possible is still unresolved and
open for another conjecture" (p. 43). The possible depends on the given,
and so "not just anything that might come to mind is useful; to be credible,
explication must be concerned with what is appropriate to the poet's customary
usage and to the context of the poem" (p. 66). What is interesting here is the
paradox that seems to emerge: poetic meaning in Stevens depends on his obscurity.
Although this obscurity obviously does not promote communication in the ordinary
sense of the term, it nevertheless establishes those conditions through which a text
is performed again and again, each time in a different way, each time with a
momentary and unique" life." Under such a program complete intelligibility is
the very death of meaning. As Stevens says in a letter to Latimer, "as soon as
people are perfectly sure of a poem they are just as likely as not to have no
further interest in it; it loses whatever potency it had." This notion that the
darkness of a text can be the source of its renewability is what makes Doggett
assume that indetenninacy is built into the very structure of the poem itself.
Such a conclusion seems to make sense, but I think it is invalid.
Let me suggest an alternative position by way of a. brief example. In
discussing the 1944 poem, II The Creations of Sound," Doggett claims that,
according to the view expressed in this piece, "it is better to think that
the poem is independent of ego consciousness" (p. 18), that, in other words,
the actual composing of a poem derives from unconscious processes. Below
is a passage from that poem with a comment by Doggett immediately following
it. I have italicized the part of the clause that Doggett does not cite:

[T]bere are words
Better without an author, without a poet,
Or having a separate author, a different poet,
An accretion from ourselves, intelligent
Beyond intelligence, an artificial man
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At a distance, a secondary expositor,
A being of sound, whom one does not approach
Through any exaggeration. From him, we collect.
In "The Creations of Sound," Stevens is concerned almost entirely with
the theory of t..he involuntary imagination. Many contradictory statements of his about the source of poetry can be considered as emanating
from a bias for one or the other conception of the nature of creativity,
as when he wrote Latimer that "writing poetry is a conscious aativity.
While pO~I,ns may very well occur, they had very much better be
caused ....
Most commentators read a Stevens' poem as if it were a direct reference to
some aspect of the poet himself; and often, as in this remark by Doggett,
there is applied a psychology of creativity equipped with the standard oppositions:
rational/irrational, voluntary/involuntary, and conscious/unconscious. Indeed,
Stevens does indicate in his prose a profound interest in understanding the nature
of poetic creativity and often, as the quotation from the Latimer letter suggests,
uses the same oppositional categories I just mentioned. This interest, moreover,
involves itself in the themes of the poetry in a number of ways. But this is not
at a11 to say that "The Creations of Sound" thematizes the imagination in the
way Doggett claims it does. His remark on what he feels to be Stevens' contradictions is typical and is of a piece with other features of his study, for
instance his emphasis (but with qualification) on the fact that the poet often
formed his lyrics in his head so that" essentially a poem was composed before it
was written" (pp. 36-37): we should not be surprised, the general message seems
to be, to find the poetry something of a muddle as far as determinate thought is
concerned. But what is most wonhy of note about Doggett's remark is that
it does not mOVe an inch to resolve the enigmas themselves; it merely leaves us
to feel that some of the phrasing could suggest the involuntary imagination.
Presumably, we are to let the enigmas keep their cloud of indeterminacy.
But the obscurity of the passage derives not from actual indetenninacy but
from outright deception. The sense of the poem is, as the title of one lyric has it,
"The Sense of the Sleight-of-hand Man." Stevens knows very well that we
shall read "The Creations of Sound)l in terms of the poet himself, even when
the poem baldly warns us that" there are words/Better without an author, without a poet." Doggett omits the first part of the clause, "there are words,"
but as it turns out, the poem is literally about its own words. Consider the
following opposition:
The voice of the poem as that
The voice of the poem as that of
of its originator (i. e., the his- vs, the text (i. C., the words themtorical figure, vy~allace Stevens)
selves here and now under your
performance)
As you read the poem, the words create Wallace Stevcns, who in this strict
linguistic framework is not a human being (that would be an "exaggeration")
but a conception evoked by the words, "an artificial man/At a distance, a secondary expositor," who is literally a H being of sound." In this most literal sense,
the words themselves are the speakers of the poem: they tell you that it is
better without an author, without a poet. They-the words right in front of
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you-arc the poet for the moment, or if a different poet is to be considered
(i. e., Wallace Stevens), he must be conceived as only an II accretion" from these
words. The poem, which is intelligent beyond the intelligence of the poct,
is thus the creator whenever it is performed by anyone, be it Wallace Stevens
as he writes it or any reader at any subsequent moment of the text's history.
Elsewhere in the same lyric the poet is called "X": he cannot be named
because he is indefinite. Two levels of ambiguity are involved: 1) the poet X
is both the text and the performer, because at the moment of performance the
two become one; 2) the poet X is any performer who enacts the language by
either writing or reading it. Thus the crucial ambiguities of the poem are to be
found in those small relational terms, the pronouns and the prepositions, in
which a multiplicity of identifications between poet, text, and audience can be
played out. For example, two of a number of ways we are to read II From him,
collect" are
We (all the performers of the poem) come together here by means
of him (this conception of the poet) that is part of this language.
We (all the words of the poem) come together here through him (the
actual author who wrote the poem).
The key to this riddle poem lies in the preposition II of" in the title, II The
Creations of Sound" : obviously poems are creations in sound, but the things of
which they speak-including even the poet-arc creations by sound.1
In this poem poetic ambiguity, which is not the same thing as indeterminacy,
is used to portray the ambiguities inherent in language itself. Because a poem is
language, we can say that in one sense the poem is the poet, that in another sense·
it is the text, and that in still another it is the reader (but notice how arid
the idea becomes in my prose!). In a recently discovered letter to R. P. Blackmur-appearing in Holly Stevens' II Flux 2," The Soutbern Review, 15, No. 4
(1979), pp. 733-74-Stevens writes that II ambiguity does not mean obfuscation.
The clearest possible definition of things essentially ambiguous leaves ambiguity."
My discussion of Ie The Creations of Sound" illustrates my more general
quarrel with Doggett: generally speaking, the enigmas in Stevens' verse are
not inscruitible and the thought which they work to conceal is anything but
undeveloped and indeterminate. Such enigmas are in fact riddles resolvable
according to a consistent self-reflexive model, one based on the idea that a poem
may talk literally about its own words. In many of the early poems, at least those
published after 1916, and almost all the later ones, Stevens centers the theme
of the creative imagination, not on the nineteenth-century ideal of a geniusoriginator but on the here-and-now of the language that is being performed.
It is not that he shifts the focus of concern from the poet to the readerj it is
rather that he thematizes the language of the text-performance itself, which
he sees incorporating botb poet and reader. As one aphorism from the" Adagia ..
has it, a poem may reveal a " poetry of words": II Poetry is a poetic conception,
1 Much of my discussion of "The Creations of Sound" appears in my review of
Tbe Sourbe171 Review's Fall, 1979 Stevc;q;:; {:c;p,t((nniaJ i§su~ ip. Tbe TFaJ/al?~
StcvC1IS Journal, (1980), 26-32,
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however expressed. A poem is poetry expressed in words. But in a poem
there is a poetry of words. Obviously, a poem may consist of several pactries."
Doggett himself seems close to this very idea when he notices how in some
poems references to the act 9£ readi~g suggests the creative imagination (pp.
59-62) or when he talks of the ghost in "Two Tales of Lia.doff" and "The
Weeping Burgher" as suggesting the absent poet who haunts the poem (p. 79).
But Doggett is far from incorporating these insights into SOfie recurrent and
specifiable theory; in fact he uses the very passages referring to the act of
reading to illustrate a discussion of Stevens' indeterminacy.
Within the scope of a review like this present one, I have no space to
demonstrate that "The Ceations of Sound" is the rule and not the exception.
Neither can I discuss the enormous questions raised by the idea of a literal
" poetry of words." 2 And yet I do wish to propose, at least, that Stevens' obscurity
derives from a very different source than the one Doggett suggests: where
he sees the enigmas issuing from thought that, out of its own lack of formation,
resists precise definition, I see the thought not only fully formed but remarkably
powerful, so much so in fact that it "plays" with highly educated readers
in the way a magician uses legerdemain to play with an audience of children.
\.Vhy are we so easily deceived? One reason is that the poem's subject is
unexpectedly and liter,ally under our noses. Nothing is so elusive as the obvious.
Of course this is not to say that there is only one idea in a Stevens poem and
that a piece can only be read in a single way, but this principle of conceptual
pluralism is part of the polysemantic nature of the artistic text in general
and would apply equally to works of other writers whose thought is more
manifestly determinate.
The deception involved in this "poetry of words" derives from the representational power of language itself, which as so many philosophers and linguists
emphasize, makes itself "invisible ,. to our attention so that we can focus
instead on the thing to which it is referring. It is a simple principle but a
slippery one nevertheless. Consider this line from "Credences of Summer":
"It is the visible rock, the audible ...." On the screen of his mind, a reader
could picture a mountain with perhaps the wind howling around it. But in
context the verse is also to be read as a reference to the poem's language, which
is also visible and audible. In the lines following this verse the rock is
called "a sure repose," "this present ground," and "the vividest respose." In
short, the one immediate and impregnable thing the voice of "Credences" can
believe is the language of "Credences" itself. "The word," stays Stevens in
ar. .other aphorism from the" Adagia," "must be the thing it represents; otherwise,
it is a symbol. It is a question of identity." The" question of identity" is in
part a question of reference, of taking" rock," say, as either a mountain or a
word. But in a poem like "Credences" and "The Creations of Sound" is not
2 I am writing a book on this entire question, A Poetry of TVords: A Study
of Self-Reference in lVallace Ste-uens. See my "The Semiotic Poetry of \Vallace
Stevens," Semiotica, 23, No. 1/2 (1978), 78-79, and ", Certain Phenomena of
Sound' : An Illustration of Wallace Stevens' Poetry of Words," TSLL, 20 (1978),

599-614.
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a matter of either/or. The" question of identity" may also suggest the
deceptive play, in poems like these, of two modes of reference in one and the
srune text.
Doggett, it is clear, dislikes the notion of this kind of secrecy in the verse, the
idea, in his words, of " the poem's sealed letter to the reader, to be opened by the
poet or some ideal intuitive critic" (pp. 43-44). But why would Stevens'
" ideal" reader be the one to uncover his deception? The possibleness of poetry,
we recall, depends on the lack of intelligibility. "Poetry," Stevens admits in one
Latimer letter " .. , cannot be made suddenly to drop all its rags and stand out
naked, fully disclosed." It should also be noted that in the letters Stevens'
consuming desire for privacy in his personal life and his religious commitment
to poetry seem part of one ,another. He is the kind of man who can write
to Hi Simons that "there is a kind of secrecy between the poet and the poem,
which, once violated, affects the integrity of the poet." VVhen he writes of
other authors, he sometimes has this same relation in mind, as when he speaks
in a letter to Barbara Church "of the difficulty Vah~ry shared with other poets
of not being explicit as to his real conception, which he likes to suggest or
imply, not state."
In "Notes toward a Supreme Fiction" we read that one of the aims of poetry
is "plainly to propound." On the other hand, Stevens' aim is also to write
genuine poetry, not just versified essays about language and the performance of
the poem. The letters reveal that the French Symbolist ideal of "pure" poetry
exerted a profound influence upon him, especially in the early years. Hence the
conflict: the more clearly defined theory becomes in the poetry, the more didactic
the final result tends to be, for even theories about poetry would constitute
a pollutant in verse striving in some degree to be "pure." Stevens' resolution
is to bury his thinking within the strategies of the text, in "the secretions of the
words," to borrow a phrase from "The Lack of Repose." As the pun on
" secretions" suggests, poetry is to conceal meaning as it releases it. In another
letter to Hi Simons, Stevens admits that "a man who wrote with the idea of
being deliberately obscure would be an imposter. But that is not the same
thing as a man who allows a difficult thing to remain difficult because, if he
explained it, it would, to his way of thinking, destroy it."
Of course Stevens is not the only one who wants his enigmas to keep his
poetry pure. Doggett's point about "the poem's sealed letter" is interesting
because the question of actual secrecy is almost never raised in connection with
the obscurity and, as I say, today discussion of even his obscurity is comparatively
rare. It seems that the more enshrined Stevens became in the American academy
as one of the great poets of the century, the greater the tendency to leave his
obscurity in the golden mist of its apparent indeterminacy. To borrow from my
earlier analogy, a large part of the child who watches the magician requires wonder, the same part that does not want to see through the mystery of its O\¥ll
astonishment. The secrecy I am imputing to Stevens is a function of not only
certain features within a text, but a dynamic between a text and a certain
kind of audience, one that reads and valorizes poetry within a given field
of expectation. The more one reads the Letters the deeper the impression that
Stevens wanted not so much to inform an audience as to train one. Secrecy
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after all is a form of control, and the Letters do reveal a man who, to say the
least, liked to control things that were important to him. In one letter to
Latimer, after explaining the role of the letter C in <I The Comedian as the Letter
C," Stevens requests that" if you refer to the role of the letter C in this poem, do,
please, refer to it as your own explanation and not as mine, although it is mine."
"Every poem," declares Stevens in another aphorism from the "Adagia," "is
a poem within a poem: the poem of the idea ...vithin the poem of the
words." Here is the same "question of identity" mentioned by the aphorism
cited a moment ago: we may treat a word in terms of the idea it evokes (as
if the word "rock" were the image of a mountain) or we may treat it as a
thing in itself. According to Doggett, however, "the poem of the words"
refers to the" given" of a work and "the poem of the idea" to its "possibleness" (pp. 42-43).
Here he is not quite following Vendler, who begins On
Extended Wings discussing the two "poems" as if they were markers for the
old form/content opposition. And yet the effect of Doggett's whole book leads us
to infer essentially the same creed as Vendler's: protect Stevens' art from his
thought by first making-believe the two are separate and then showing reverence
for the former and contempt for the latter. On the contrary, the most
extraordinary part of Stevens' art is his thought.
TERRANCE KING

Wayne State University

A Literature Without Qualities: American Literature Since 194) by Warner
Berthoff. Berkeley, Los Angeles. London: University of California Press,
1979. Pp. 204. $10.95.

I,

Certain works of fiction, as everybody knows, manipulate not 'Only distance but
height. Flaubert, narrating his movement toward Y onville, draws closer not
only horizontally but from above. And Hardy, especially Hardy, renders his
world, at crucial points, as if from the Goodyear blimp. One rarely thinks of
expository works as if they manipulate height in any way analogous to works of
fiction. Yet that is the illusion that Warner Berthoff's book most firmly
leaves-an elevated, Jovian ordering of a long, diverse period in our cultural life.
The illusion of height has something to do with the tone of the scholarship:
footnoting Barthes' The Pleasures of the Text, Berthoff remarks that it is
translated "(very accurately)." It has something to do with the style, which
is heavy, at times involuted, and fond of laying out the collective traits of
"us." "How, most particularly, within our inter-locking system of collaborative-competitive existence (of which language itself is the most extended,
but our established political custom and economic division of labor scarcely less
so), do we respond to and impinge upon one another as centers or as vessels of
energy and possibility?" And the Olympian angle of observation has quite a bit
to do with the scale of the book: a work on the whole of American literature
since the war-some thirty-five years-all done in one hundred seventy-seven pages
of small format text. But the illusion of height finally has most to do with the
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quality of Berthoff's judgments. Taking the measure of thirty-five years of
American literature, he judges it against certain prior, transcendent standards;
and having so judged it, he decides that he doesn't like it very well.
The concept that forms the title, a literature" without qualities," comes from the
title of the novel by Robert Musil. What it means, as Bertholf extends and
applies it, is that American literature since the war retreats from the larger world
of consequence and historical significance, retreats moreover from a continuity
with its predecessors, often opting for small exercises in entertainment,
virtUOllSity. and solipsistic self-amusement. On the question of magnitude,
Berthoff measures the scope and ambition of works since the war, finding that
nobody any longer seeks to write a masterpiece. Of those areas of literature
that have engaged most readers and writers on the subject-the emergence of a
brilliant group of Jewish novelists, the extraordinary ingenuity with which
certain writers of fiction have sought to move beyond the possibilities of
realism, the vigor of the drama, the altogether different voice of women in
the literature of the past three decades, the consolidation of an authoritative
literature by and about Blacks, the movement of poetry beyond a rather limited
canon of neo-rnetaphysicals-none of these interest Berthoff particularly. Of
the Jewish novelists, for example, lVlaJamud is mentioned in one collective
footnote, Roth is cited, in a series among others, as a maker of "expert prose
entertainments," and Bellow is discussed slightly and rather airily. Of the experimentalists, Barth's fiction is cited twice, with minimal respect, Barthelme is
gathered, among others, as a perpetrator of "resolute performative novelties," a
gathering which also includes the only mention of Coover. Of the drama,
Tennessee Williams is never mentioned. Of the women, Berthoff seems intermittently fascinated by Joyce Carol Oatesj but Mary IVlcCarthy is never
mentioned, nor is Grace Paley, nor Alison Lurie, nor Joan Didion. Of the
Blacks, Ellison gets passing respect, Baldwin a footnote, and Toni Morrison no
mention. And of the poets, it is really only Lo,ovell who engages his sustained
attention, Roethke, for a single example, appearing in a series, among nine others,
as an instance of the period's struggle" with its own will to self-destruction."
Well then, what does he write about? Wallace Stevens for one, Henry
Miller for another. The commentary on those two writers makes up roughly
a third of the book If one recalls that both writers achieved their reputations
and completed most of their major works before the end of the war, one is
entitled to wonder what they are doing there, especially in the face of the
dismissal of so much else. The rationale, of course, is that both are seen as
precursors. In the case of Miller, the linkage is pursued tenaciously but unpersuasively. It is true that Miller seems, in retrospect, to open areas of language
and subject matter and to establish a relationship to experience that can be
found in much fiction since. But that he is the pivot upon which post-war fiction
turns seems to me dubious. Comparable claims could be made for a substantial
number of figures from Kafka to S. J. Perelman. The linkage between Stevens
and poetry since is less tenaciously pursued; yet it is surely implicit or the
treatment of Stevens would have no justification. The idea, in any case, that the
poetry of the last thirty-five years can best be seen by reference to Stevens seems
to me a preposterous assumption. And the reader for whom it is good to be
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alive and reading in these disquieting times will suspect, by the time he reaches
that point, that Berthoff's sustained treatment of Stevens is a not-very-subtle means
of patronizing a large number of poets since, who can be seen, in comparison to
the Master of Hartford, to be triflers.
There is always room in the world for jeremiads. And no doubt our official
sense of Qur own literature is in need of refinement, a refinement that may well
necessitate a kind of virtuoso nay-saying. It is a function that Berthoff's book
sometimes serves, in a sustained passage, for example, in which he pays tribute to
the awesome accomplishment of Gravity's Rainbow while strenuously pointing
out Pynchon's final inability to put us in touch with ourselves. Right or wrong,
it is a passage that carries authority and conviction. But .that angle of insightthe little boy in" The Emperor's New Clothes "-is not finally the one that gives
the dominant tone to Berthoff's book, Rather it is the tone of a fairly ungenerous
imagination for which the most characteristic gesture is not buoyant opposition
but the back of the hand. The period, needless to say, deserves better.
PHILIP STEVICK

Temple University

